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WILLIAM BAUDE

STANDING IN THE SHADOW
OF CONGRESS

In Spokeo v Robins,1 the Supreme Court confronted one of the harder
questions of its intricate law of standing to sue. The question is
whether Article III of the Constitution limits Congress’s ability to
create legal rights that can be vindicated in federal court—and, if so,
what those limits are. The Court’s cases had provided two contradictory approaches to answering it.
Boxed in by these conﬂicting precedents, Spokeo failed to resolve the
problem. The violation of a legal right can support standing, said the
Court, only if it represents an injury that is “concrete”—a term that
simultaneously includes some “intangible” injuries, but requires that
they be “real.”2 These terms, and the Court’s explanation of them, do
little work to answer the core question. And to the extent that they do
point to a general approach, that approach is a wrong turn.
But Spokeo also produced a glimmer of hope for approaching
standing in the future: a concurring opinion by Justice Thomas,
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136 S Ct 1540 (2016).
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Id at 1548–49.
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building off of an important line of scholarship on the long-standing
difference between public rights and private rights. While Justice
Thomas’s proposal is not yet fully developed, it may provide a theoretically satisfying way to make sense of the Court’s approach to
statutory standing. Even if his answers are not perfect, they are answers
to the right questions, which will reframe the problem of standing in a
helpful way. Justice Thomas’s concurrence may be one of the most
fruitful things to happen to standing at the Supreme Court in many
years.
The rest of this article explains the problem of standing in the face
of Congress’s creation of statutory rights. Part I describes the basic
problem and the prior cases that address it. Part II describes the
Court’s attempted answer in Spokeo. Part III argues that Spokeo’s
answer is unhelpful and even problematic, and could have ominous
implications for the law of privacy and other areas of substantive law.
Part IV shows why Justice Thomas may have provided a better way
forward.
I. The Problem of Standing to Enforce Statutory Rights
The Constitution gives federal courts the “judicial” power to
decide “cases” or “controversies.”3 It is black letter law that these
terms require the case to be between the proper sorts of parties, ones
who have some legal dispute that the court can resolve. A key part of
this requirement is that the plaintiff have “standing” to sue, which
means—says the Court—that the plaintiff must have suffered (or be
likely to suffer) a “concrete, particularized” “injury” (or sometimes
“injury in fact”); that the injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action”; and that the injury must be “redressable by a favorable
ruling.”4
To be sure, even these propositions have had their critics, Raoul
Berger5 and Laurence Tribe6 among them. And there are further
complexities as well, such as the questions of whether standing should
3

US Const, Art III, §§ 1, 2.

4

Clapper v Amnesty International, 133 S Ct 1138, 1147 (2013). There are many similar but
subtly different formulations in the case law.
5
See, for example, Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional
Requirement?, 78 Yale L J 816 (1969).
6
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-27, at 110–12 (1st ed, 1978); 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-14, at 391–92 (3d ed, 2000).
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be seen as jurisdictional or part of the merits of the claim,7 and of
whether “standing” and “injury in fact” are novel concepts or old ones
in new language.8 But these requirements of standing doctrine have
grown relatively settled despite the debates.
Beyond this settlement, however, the Court’s standing cases have
equivocated about an important question lying behind those requirements. What relationship do statutes have to the injury needed
for standing? Is the violation of a statutory right an injury? To ask
these questions is not to doubt that injury is a requirement—it is now
taken as a given that injury is required.9 Rather the question is what
law deﬁnes that injury. To what extent is it shaped by ordinary law, and
therefore by Congress, and to what extent is it instead hard-coded in
Article III?
In two mostly separate lines of reasoning, the Court has said on the
one hand that the content of an injury is shaped by law, and therefore
by Congress; and said on the other hand that some congressional
attempts to do so are unconstitutional. The two lines of reasoning—
which I will, unoriginally, call Proposition A and Proposition B10—
have coexisted for some time, but they are in tension.
a. “congress may enact statutes creating legal rights,
the invasion of which creates standing”
This ﬁrst branch of the Court’s cases reﬂects a seemingly simple
intuition: Legislatures create rights. Invasions of those rights are
injuries. To consider an obvious example, it might be that no private
person has standing to sue over misuse of a piece of public property,

7
For example, Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L J 425, 450–56 (1974); William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L J 221, 223 (1988).
8
Compare Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 Mich L Rev 163, 166 (1992), and Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan L Rev 1371 (1988), with Ann Woolhandler and
Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich L Rev 689 (2004).
9
Cf. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L J 1219, 1219
(1993) (criticizing critics of Lujan for failing to “grant the artist . . . his donee”—viz “that
injury in fact is required for standing under Article III”).
10
Cf. Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 995 (3d ed 1988) (dividing federal
question cases into “Proposition A” and “Proposition B”); Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory
Remedies for Takings, 128 Harv L Rev 1630, 1634 (2015) (ascertaining “two separate lines of
authority about takings remedies, which I will call the A line and the B line”).
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owned in common by the public. But if the legislature parcels up that
property into private plots, each new owner has standing to litigate
their own private property rights against intruders.11
Various early cases in England and America featured this basic
intuition that invasion of legal rights was necessarily an injury. As
early as the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries, English courts had
allowed suits for trespass (to persons and to property) even when
there had been no damage and no injury in fact apart from the legal
injury of the trespass itself.12 And in America, Joseph Story afﬁrmed
an expanded version of this principle when allowing downstream mill
owners to sue an upstream mill owner for illegal diversion of water.13
Surveying the precedents, he concluded: “whenever there is a clear
violation of a right, it is not necessary in an action of this sort to show
actual damage; that every violation imports damage; and if no other
be proved, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages.”14
It took longer for this principle to appear explicitly in Supreme
Court cases about standing, perhaps in part because the language of
modern standing doctrine did not appear until the twentieth century.
In any event, in the twentieth century, the Court reafﬁrmed that legal
rights are sufﬁcient to ground standing. Moreover, they were sufﬁcient to do so even in the case of rights unknown to the common law.
For instance, in Trafﬁcante v Metropolitan Life Insurance, the Court
found standing for two tenants of an apartment building to challenge
their landlord’s illegally discriminatory rental practices.15 The tenants had obviously not themselves been denied the ability to rent
there (that is why they were tenants), but they wanted to live in a more
racially mixed apartment building and thought the law gave them a
right to do so. Even though such a right would not have existed at the
common law, it was enough for standing.
To be sure, it is not clear that the statutory right was the only
source of standing, since the plaintiffs had also named other injuries,
such as the loss of “social beneﬁts,” “missed business and professional
advantages,” and the “embarrassment and economic damage . . . from
11

See Woolhandler and Nelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 693–94 (cited in note 8).

12

F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L Rev 275, 281
(2008) (discussing I de S et ux v W de S (1348), and Hulle v Orynge (1466)).
13
Webb v Portland Manufacturing Co., 29 F Cas 506 (CCD Me 1838) (opinion of Story,
Circuit Justice) (cited in Hessick, 93 Cornell L Rev at 285 (cited in note 12)).
14

Id.

15

409 US 205, 207 (1972).
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being ‘stigmatized’ as residents of a ‘white ghetto.’”16 But the majority did not spend time substantiating these consequences. And four
Justices wrote separately to emphasize their reliance on the statutory
right: “Absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great difﬁculty in concluding that petitioners’ complaint in this case presented
a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court
under Art. III of the Constitution. But with that statute purporting to
give all those who are authorized to complain to the agency the right
also to sue in court, I would sustain the statute.”17
The Court relied on this proposition most explicitly in Havens
Realty v Coleman, where it considered (among other things) the rights
of Sylvia Coleman, a black Fair Housing Act “tester.”18 Coleman had
been told, apparently falsely and because of her race, that there were
no apartments available to rent, and she sued for the violation of the
Fair Housing Act’s “steering” provisions. Even though she had no
intent to actually rent from the defendants, the Court found that she
had standing to sue. The key was the injury to her statutory rights to
truthful and nondiscriminatory information.
As the Court put it:
Congress has thus conferred on all “persons” a legal right to truthful information about available housing. This congressional intention cannot be
overlooked in determining whether testers have standing to sue. As we
have previously recognized, the actual or threatened injury required by Art.
III may exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing.” . . . In the instant case, respondent Coleman—
the black tester—alleged injury to her statutorily created right to truthful
housing information. . . . If the facts are as alleged, then respondent has
suffered “speciﬁc injury” from the challenged acts of petitioners, and the
Art. III requirement of injury in fact is satisﬁed.19

The holding in Havens relied on similar statements the Court had
repeatedly made in dicta: For instance, it had said that “Congress may
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute”20 or

16

Id at 208.

17

Id at 212 (White, J, concurring).
455 US 363 (1982).

18
19

Id at 373–74 (citations omitted).

20

Linda RS v Richard D, 410 US 614, 617 n 3 (1972), subsequently quoted in O’Shea v
Littleton, 414 US 488, 493 n 2 (1973).
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that “[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist
solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing.’”21 Similarly, in denying standing to challenge potential conﬂicts of interest under the Constitution’s Incompatibility
Clause22 the Court expressed “no doubt that if the Congress enacted a
statute creating such a legal right, the requisite injury for standing
would be found in an invasion of that right.”23
Not all applications of the principle are dicta, either. For instance,
in Hardin v Kentucky Utilities, the Court noted that it had “repeatedly
held that the economic injury which results from lawful competition
cannot, in and of itself, confer standing on the injured business.”24 But
the Court also pointed to a different line of cases that recognized
standing for injured competitors “when the particular statutory provision invoked does reﬂect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest.”25 Hardin found standing on that basis, which works
only because Congress can create rights against competitive injuries
that support standing.
Similarly, in FEC v Akins, the Court held that a group of voters had
standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission’s refusal to
subject the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to various
disclosure requirements.26 The Court concluded that the voters’
“inability to obtain information . . . that, on respondents’ view of the
law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public” was enough to
satisfy Article III’s standing requirements. It admitted that a similar
injury had not been enough for standing in United States v Richardson,
where the Court had rejected a taxpayer’s demand for information
about CIA expenditures.27 But in Akins, by contrast, “there [was] a
statute which . . . does seek to protect individuals such as respondents

21

Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda RS v Richard D).

22

US Const, Art I, § 6, cl 2 (“no person holding any ofﬁce under the United States, shall be
a member of either House during his continuance in ofﬁce”).
23

Schlesinger v Reservists to Stop the War, 418 US 208, 224 n 14 (1973).

24

Hardin v Kentucky Utilities, 390 US 1, 5–6 (1967) (citing Railroad Co. v Ellerman, 105 US
166 (1882); Alabama Power v Ickes, 302 US 464 (1938); Tennessee Power v TVA, 306 US 118
(1939); Perkins v Lukens Steel, 310 US 113 (1940)).
25
Hardin, 390 US at 6 (citing Chicago Junction Case, 264 US 258 (1924); Alton Railroad v
United States, 315 US 15, 19 (1942); Chicago v Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, 357 US
77, 83 (1958)).
26

524 US 11 (1998).

27

United States v Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974) (discussed by Akins, 524 US at 21–22).
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from the kind of harm they say they have suffered, i.e., failing to
receive particular information about campaign-related activities.”28
While the Court noted other differences between the cases, the
statute seemed to be the crux of it:29 “failing to receive particular
information” was itself a constitutionally sufﬁcient injury in Akins,
but not in Richardson, because of the right created by Congress.
Similar logic presumably supports standing in cases under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), where individuals may request
information from the government and sue if it is denied.30 The only
injury in such cases is the denial of information, as in Akins and Richardson, but the Court has said in dictum that FOIA plaintiffs need show
only “that they sought and were denied speciﬁc agency records,”31 and
it continues to decide FOIA cases without demanding any more.32
As we will see, these and other cases led many lower courts to think
of Proposition A as presenting the general rule of standing: that a
statutory cause of action created by Congress necessarily creates a
right, the invasion of which satisﬁed Article III’s requirement of injury.33
b. “a hard ﬂoor of article iii jurisdiction that cannot
be removed by statute”
Despite the Court’s widespread use of statutory rights as a basis for
Article III standing, the Court has also sometimes adverted to Article III limits on those rights. That is, it has found that federal courts
28

Akins, 524 US at 22.

Id (observing “[t]he fact that the Court in Richardson focused upon taxpayer standing, not
voter standing, places that case at still a greater distance from the case before us.” But adding
“[w]e are not suggesting . . . that Richardson would have come out differently if only the
plaintiff had asserted his standing to sue as a voter, rather than as a taxpayer.”).
29

30
See generally 5 USC § 552. See also David Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the
Freedom of Information Act, 165 U Pa L Rev (forthcoming 2017), at https://ssrn.com
/abstractp2907719 (describing individual-centered FOIA regime).
31
Public Citizen v U.S. Department of Justice, 491 US 440, 449 (1989). See also Roberts,
42 Duke L J at 1228 n 60 (cited in note 9) (“When an agency wrongfully denies an individual’s FOIA request, that particular individual has suffered injury in fact under Article III
and has standing to sue in federal court to redress that injury.”).
32
See Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U Pa J Const L 745, 771 (2016) (citing cases).
33
See, for example, Beaudry v TeleCheck Services, Inc., 579 F3d 702, 707 (6th Cir 2009);
Hammer v Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F3d 492 (8th Cir 2014); Edwards v First American, 610 F3d
514 (9th Cir 2010); Robey v Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, LLC, 434 F3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir
2006); Zivotofsky ex rel Ari Z v Secretary of State, 444 F3d 614, 617–19 (DC Cir 2006).
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lack constitutional power to hear certain lawsuits, even when Congress has tried to create an enforceable legal right and that legal right
has been violated.
The most famous case in this second line is Lujan v Defenders of
Wildlife, an opinion written by the late Justice Scalia that denied standing to an environmental group whose members wished to challenge a
regulation under the Endangered Species Act.34 (The regulation had
interpreted Section 7(a)(2) of the Act,35 which required interagency
consultation to avoid harm to endangered and threatened species, to
apply only to actions taken in the United States or on the high seas.36)
Some of the group’s theories of standing turned on claims that the
regulation would injure their ability to see or study various animals.
The Court rejected these as “pure speculation and fantasy.”37 This
required the Court to turn to the more lasting issue: whether Congress had created a right to those procedures, the invasion of which
could support standing.
The argument had persuaded the D.C. Circuit, and the Court
summarized it as follows:
that, because § 7(a)(2) requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit
provision [16 USC § 1540(g)] creates a procedural right to consultation in
all persons—so that anyone can ﬁle suit in federal court to challenge the
Secretary’s (or presumably any other ofﬁcial’s) failure to follow the assertedly correct consultative procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury ﬂowing from that failure.38

The Court seemed to assume for purposes of the case that the
statute had indeed created such a right (though the opinion cast some
aspersions by describing it as “an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law”).39 But the Court denied that the invasion of such a
congressionally created right was sufﬁcient to support standing,
holding that “there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III

34

Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992)

35

16 USC § 1536(a)(2).

36

51 Fed Reg 19926 (1986).
Lujan, 504 US at 567.

37
38

Id at 572.

39

Id.
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inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right.”40 It would violate the
separation of powers, the Court concluded, “[t]o permit Congress to
convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive ofﬁcers’
compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the
courts.”41
Lujan has been subject to extensive academic criticism,42 but it was
neither the last case in this line nor the ﬁrst. Sixteen years later, the
Court said the same thing in another case quite like Lujan, Summers v
Earth Island Institute.43
Summers was another environmental group’s challenge to another
procedural defect in another environmental regulation—this one
concerning ﬁre rehabilitation and timber salvage sales. Once again, in
an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected various theories of
standing including one premised on Proposition A. The Court acknowledged that the challengers claimed to “have suffered procedural
injury, namely that they have been denied the ability to ﬁle comments
on some Forest Service actions,” but concluded that “deprivation of
a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by
the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufﬁcient to create
Article III standing.”44
Then the Court explicitly denied Proposition A:
It makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress.
That can loosen the strictures of the redressability prong of our standing
inquiry. . . . Unlike redressability, however, the requirement of injury in
fact is a hard ﬂoor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by
statute.45

The Court has also found standing limits on Congress’s ability to
create enforceable rights in other cases, including in opinions not
written by Justice Scalia. In Raines v Byrd the Court expanded
Proposition B to create limits on congressional standing. In Raines

40

Id at 576.

41

Id at 577. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which I discuss below.
For example, Sunstein, 91 Mich L Rev at 163 (cited in note 8); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 Duke L J 1141 (1993); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power,
42 Duke L J 1170 (1993).
43
555 US 488 (2009).
42

44

Id at 496

45

Id at 497 (emphasis added).
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several legislators wished to challenge the so-called Line Item Veto
Act, which authorized the President to decline to spend money they
had voted to appropriate.46 As a prestatutory matter, it was somewhat
debatable whether legislators had been personally injured when the
consequence of their votes was illegally ignored.47 But in Byrd there
was once again an express statutory right to sue, speciﬁcally vested in
“any Member of Congress” to enjoin the act as unconstitutional.48
The Court was unimpressed, declaring it “settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting
the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”49 Not even Justices Breyer and Stevens, who wrote dissents,
relied heavily on Proposition A.50
And indeed this skeptical line of cases has early roots. The Supreme Court had rejected, on Article III grounds, a congressionally
created right to sue as early as 1911, in a confusing opinion in Muskrat
v United States.51 That case arose after Congress had passed a series of
statutes altering various allotments of property from the Cherokee
tribe.52 Four people—David Muskrat, J. Henry Dick, William Brown,
and Levi B. Gritts—wanted to bring various suits challenging some of
the statutes, and Congress wanted to help them do so. In 1907 Congress had passed a statute providing:
That William Brown and Levi B. Gritts . . . and David Muskrat and J.
Henry Dick . . . be, and they are hereby, authorized and empowered to
institute their suits in the court of claims to determine the validity of any

46

Raines v Byrd, 521 US 811 (1997).

47

Id at 820–29 & n 4 (discussing precedents).

48

Line Item Veto Act, § 3(a)(1), Pub Law No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200, 1211 (1996).
Raines, 521 US at 820.

49

50
Id at 835 (Stevens, J, dissenting); id at 838–39 (Breyer, J, dissenting) (“As the majority
points out, Congress has enacted a speciﬁc statute (signed by the President) granting the
plaintiffs authority to bring this case. That statutory authorization eliminates any prudential
standing limitations and signiﬁcantly lessens the risk of unwanted conﬂict with the Legislative
Branch. Congress, however, cannot grant the federal courts more power than the Constitution itself authorizes us to exercise.”).
51
219 US 346 (1911).
52
For the original allotment, see An Act to provide for the allotment of the lands of the
Cherokee Nation, for the disposition of town sites therein, and for other purposes, ch 1375,
32 Stat 716 (1902); for the amendments, see An Act to provide for the ﬁnal disposition of the
affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian Territory, and for other purposes, ch 1867,
34 Stat 137 (1906), amended by 1907 Indian Appropriations Bill, ch 3504, 34 Stat 325 (1906);
and also An Act Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant right of way for pipe lines
through Indian lands, ch 505, 33 Stat 65 (1904).
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acts of Congress passed since the said act of July ﬁrst, nineteen hundred and
two, in so far as said acts, or any of them, attempt to increase or extend the
restrictions upon alienation, encumbrance, or the right to lease the allotments of lands of Cherokee citizens, or to increase the number of persons
entitled to share in the ﬁnal distribution of lands and funds of the Cherokees
beyond those enrolled for allotment as of September ﬁrst, nineteen hundred and two, and provided for in the said act of July ﬁrst, nineteen hundred
and two.53

When Muskrat’s case got to the Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged that “[t]his act is the authority for the maintenance of
these two suits.”54 But it found that act, and its authority, unconstitutional under Article III.
The Court’s reasoning was famously obscure.55 It mentioned
several earlier cases that had invalidated claims legislation where the
adjudications would not be enforced without exercise of political
discretion.56 But the Muskrat statute made the Supreme Court’s
decision ﬁnal57 and so it did not raise this problem. Instead, the Court
seemed to have two related complaints, both of which echo modern
standing requirements. One was that the plaintiffs had been wrong to
sue the United States, when their goal was “not to assert a property
right as against the government, or to demand compensation for
alleged wrongs because of action upon its part.”58 The other was that
their suit was effectively a request for an advisory opinion about the
constitutionality of the allotment statutes.59

53
54

1908 Indian Appropriations Bill, ch 2285, 34 Stat 1015, 1028.
Muskrat, 219 US at 351.

55
David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 1888–1986, at
92 (1990); Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System 130 (1st ed 1953) (“Complete the following sentence: ‘The Supreme Court held that
no justiciable controversy was presented in the Muskrat case because . . .’ ”); see also 3
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 21.01, at 120–24 (1958) (“The Court gave
seven reasons for the decision, not one of which will withstand close examination.”).
56
Muskrat, 219 US at 353–54 (citing Gordon v United States, 117 US 697, 702 (1885);
United States v Ferreira, 54 US (13 How) 40, 47 (1852)).
57
58

Muskrat, 219 US at 351, 361.
Id.

59
Id (“It is therefore evident that there is neither more nor less in this procedure than an
attempt to provide for a judicial determination, ﬁnal in this court, of the constitutional validity of an act of Congress”); id at 361–62 (“The whole purpose of the law is to determine
the constitutional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising between parties
concerning a property right necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against the government in its sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only
judgment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation in question”).
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In the end, even though Congress had attempted to give the
plaintiffs a right to that adjudication, the Court found it violated
Article III: “This attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of the act of Congress is not presented in a ‘case’ or ‘controversy,’ to which, under the Constitution of the United States, the
judicial power alone extends,” and hence “exceeded the limitations of
legislative authority.”60 Muskrat thus shows that the Court’s skepticism about the full force of Proposition A has deep roots. It may be
tempting to distinguish both Raines and Muskrat as reﬂecting special
separation-of-powers concerns, and therefore as not strictly relevant
to the question of statutory rights and Article III standing. But this
distinction is artiﬁcial. The Court has described its Article III standing doctrine generally as a doctrine of separation of powers.61 To
quote Raines itself: “‘The law of Article III standing is built on a single
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.’”62
The Court has not expounded the two propositions about statutory rights in complete isolation from one another. Some of the
Proposition B cases attempt to reconcile themselves with Proposition
A. For instance, in Lujan, the Court stressed that “Nothing in this
contradicts the principle that “[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may
exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing.’”63 That principle, Lujan suggested, “involved Congress’ elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”64
Similarly, Justice Kennedy, who provided one of the ﬁve votes for
the majority opinion in Lujan, added in a separate concurrence that:
“As Government programs and policies become more complex and
far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of
action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition. . . .
In my view, Congress has the power to deﬁne injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before, and I do not read the Court’s opinion to suggest
60

Id at 361–62.
See, for example, Susan B. Anthony List v Driehaus, 134 S Ct 2334, 2341 (2014); Arizona
Christian School Tuition Org. v Winn, 563 US 125, 132, 135 (2011); Lujan, 504 US at 560. See
also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 Suffolk U L Rev 881 (1983).
62
Raines, 521 US at 820 (quoting Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984)).
61

63

Lujan, 504 US at 578 (quoting Warth and Linda RS ).

64

Lujan, 504 US at 578.
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a contrary view.”65 He added that “[i]n exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring
suit,” and he did not think that Congress had done so in Lujan.66 Still,
as we will see, such acknowledgments have not prevented a conﬂict
from arising between the two propositions.
c. the growing tension
While these two propositions have coexisted in standing case law
for decades, the tension between them makes a simple question very
hard to answer: When does a right created by Congress nonetheless
fall below the “hard ﬂoor” of Article III jurisdiction? In the years
leading up to Spokeo, the difﬁculty of that question became apparent.
That difﬁculty became salient in First American Financial Corp. v
Edwards,67 a case brought under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, which forbids kickbacks and revenue splits for those who
settle regulated mortgage transactions.68 These restrictions are designed to eliminate conﬂicts of interest among, for example, one’s
lender, one’s real estate lawyer, and one’s title insurer. The restrictions are backed by criminal penalties,69 and also a civil cause of action
that awards statutory damages “equal to three times the amount of
any charge paid for such settlement service.”70
Denise Edwards bought a house in Cleveland with title insurance
provided by First American, and then complained that First American
had been the beneﬁciary of a referral agreement banned by the act. As a
matter of law, her damages seemed to be $2,186.55, three times the
amount that she and her settlement agent paid for the insurance.71 But
as a matter of reality, her damages seemed to be zero: Ohio law
regulates the price and terms of title insurance,72 so Edwards got exactly what she would have gotten in any event. First American might
65

Id at 580 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

66

Id.

67

567 US 756 (2012).
12 USC § 1607 (a), (b).

68
69
70

12 USC § 1607 (d)(1).
12 USC § 1607 (d)(2).

71
See Edwards v First American Corp., 610 F3d 514, 516 (9th Cir 2010) for these numbers,
though I did the math myself.
72

Ohio Rev Code Ann §§ 3935.04, 3935.07.
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have proﬁted from an illegal referral agreement, but Edwards did not
suffer from it; the victims, if any, were First American’s competitors.
Under established standing doctrine, the case presented a puzzle.
On one hand, black letter law requires Edwards to have suffered an
actual or imminent injury, and she was not in fact overcharged. So the
case seems to fall below the “hard ﬂoor” of Article III. On the other
hand, perhaps we can see her injury as being not her out-of-pocket
costs, but the conﬂict of interest itself: Congress gave Edwards “a
right to a conﬂict-free transaction,”73 and that right can be vindicated
even if it is not an economic one, just as the right to live in legally
integrated housing can be vindicated even if it is not an economic one
either. And yet if Congress can deﬁne such an injury, what remains of
Article III’s “hard ﬂoor”?
The Ninth Circuit did not fully confront the problem, instead
writing its opinion as if only the Proposition A cases existed:
“The injury required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’” “Essentially,
the standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as
granting persons in the plaintiff ’s position a right to judicial relief.” Thus,
we must look to the text of RESPA to determine whether it prohibited
Defendants’ conduct; if it did, then Plaintiff has demonstrated an injury
sufﬁcient to satisfy Article III.74

The ﬁrst two quotations are true enough, but the last sentence does
not quite follow. For as we have seen, while the Court has said that
Congress can create legal rights that support standing, it has also
sometimes said that it cannot—otherwise Summers and Lujan and
Raines and even Muskrat would all be wrongly decided. The Ninth
Circuit gave no explanation for invoking Proposition A while ignoring Proposition B.
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the Supreme Court took an
interest in the case. And at oral argument, it looked as if the Court was
poised to continue expanding Proposition B beyond Lujan and Summers. For instance, the Chief Justice seemed to deny the existence of
Proposition A altogether:
73
This was one of her counsel’s formulations in the Supreme Court oral argument. First
American Financial Corp. v Edwards, No 10-708, Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcript at
28, 39.
74
Edwards v First American Corp., 610 F3d 514, 517 (9th Cir 2010) (quoting Fulﬁllment
Services v UPS, 528 F3d 614, 618 (9th Cir 2008), and Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 500 (1975)).
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You said violation of a statute is injury in fact. I would have thought that
would be called injury in law. And when we say, as all our standing cases
have, is that what is required is injury in fact, I understand that to be in
contradistinction to injury in law. And when you tell me all that you’ve got
or all that you want to plead is violation of the statute, that doesn’t sound
like injury in fact.75

So too did Justice Alito: “[W]e are looking for whether there is an
injury in fact. Put aside the question of whether there is a breach of
the duty in law. There is allegedly here. I just don’t see where there is
an injury in fact.”76 And Justice Scalia described the plaintiff ’s injury
as “the vague notion of—of buying it from—from—I don’t know, a
white knight? Is—is that the kind of injury-in-fact that our cases talk
about? . . . It seems to me purely—I don’t know—philosophical.”77
Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy described Proposition A as “circular”:
“For you to say he was entitled to it and, therefore, it’s an injury,
that’s just—that’s just circular. That gives no substance at all to the—
to the meaning of the term ‘injury.’”78 And he later expressed skepticism speciﬁcally “that Congress can say that you have a right to buy
a conﬂict-free title insurance policy.”79 It looked to observers as if
the Court would reject a thorough endorsement of Proposition A,
“under which no showing of injury is required simply because Congress has provided for statutory damages.”80
Then came an unexpected reprieve: on the last day of the Term,
seven months after oral argument, the Court dismissed the case as
improvidently granted. As is typical, the Court issued no explanation
for the late abandonment of the case. The timing makes it unlikely
that the Court had suddenly discovered a “vehicle problem”81—a
procedural wrinkle or faulty premise that made it hard to reach the
question presented. Rather, it seems that the Court had some difﬁculty answering the question. Perhaps a Justice changed his or her
75
First American Financial Corp. v Edwards, No 10-708, Supreme Court Oral Argument
Transcript at 32–33.
76
77
78

Id at 29.
Id at 44.
Id at 47.

79

Id at 57.
Christopher Wright, Argument Recap: First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, SCOTUSBlog,
Nov 29 (2011), at http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/argument-recap-ﬁrst-american-ﬁnancial
-corp-v-edwards/.
80

81

Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 Harv L Rev 1, 62 (2012).
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mind at the last minute; perhaps the Court’s resources were stretched
thin by the massive drafting exercise in NFIB v Sebelius (decided that
day);82 or perhaps the Justices simply regretted confronting one of the
hardest questions in modern federal courts doctrine. Later that year,
Pam Karlan suggested that “[a]s with . . . the signiﬁcance of the French
Revolution for western civilization—it may be too soon to tell.”83 As it
happens, we did not have to wait long for the next sortie.
II. Spokeo’s Attempted Answer
Last Term, the Court tried once again to make progress on
the doctrinal problem it had created for itself. The vehicle was Spokeo
v Robins, another consumer protection case arising out of the Ninth
Circuit.84 This time the consumer protection statute was the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, which contains a range of substantive and
procedural requirements for consumer reporting agencies, including
the requirement that they “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”85 It also gives a cause of
action to consumers “with respect to [whom]” these requirements are
violated, for $100–$1,000 in statutory damages.86
The plaintiff was Thomas Robins, an unemployed, unmarried man
living in Virginia. Like many of us, Mr. Robins was the subject of a
consumer report on www.spokeo.com. And as with many of us, not
all of that information was accurate.87 But as in First American, even
if these inaccuracies reﬂected a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, it was a little hard to say how they had actually injured
Mr. Robins. Spokeo described him as richer and more educated than

82

132 S Ct 2566 (2012).

83

Karlan, 126 Harv L Rev at 62 (cited in note 81).
136 S Ct 1540 (2016).

84
85

15 USC § 1681(e).

86

15 USC § 1681(n).
For instance, while writing this article I signed up at www.spokeo.com to look up my own
information, and discovered that pieces of it seemed to be associated with at least nine different
identities, which variously contained the wrong age, http://www.spokeo.com/William-Baude/Illinois
/Chicago/p40004472993, wrong address, http://www.spokeo.com/William-Baude/Indiana/Bloom
ington/p30715587001, wrong marital status, http://www.spokeo.com/William-Baude/Illinois
/Chicago/p40024907275, and even the wrong surname, http://www.spokeo.com/William-Bavde
/Connecticut/New-Haven/p40001834445 and http://www.spokeo.com/William-Daude/California
/San-Diego/p11151218031. I did not sue.
87
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he really was, with a spouse and children that he did not have. To the
extent these facts have a valence, they might seem like good things. At
a minimum, they do not obviously seem like bad things.
That is how the district court saw the case, and it held that despite
the statutory violation, Robins lacked standing to sue. It thought, per
Proposition B, that Robins had to show a concrete and imminent
injury beyond the statutory violation.88 In principle, this could be
something like showing that the inaccuracies had caused him to lose
or miss out on a job, which Robins tried to allege,89 but the court
thought the allegation was “speculative, attenuated and implausible”
and that Robins had “fail[ed] to allege facts sufﬁcient to trace his
alleged harm to Spokeo’s alleged violations.”90
The Ninth Circuit, however, found standing because of the statutory violation, as it had in First American.91 This time its reasoning
was slightly more careful. It concluded (citing First American)92 that
“the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufﬁcient injury in fact to
confer standing,”93 in accordance with Proposition A. But it also
recognized, in accordance with Proposition B, that “[o]f course, the
Constitution limits the power of Congress to confer standing.”94 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that those limits did not apply to Robins,
because his injury was personal (i.e., his rather than somebody else’s)
and individual (i.e., not collective).95 Hence, it thought, Robins’s
statutory injuries were “concrete, de facto injuries” that Congress
could “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries.”96

88
See Order Correcting Prior Ruling and Finding Moot Motion for Certiﬁcation, No
CV10-05306 ODW (AGRx) (CD Cal, Sept 19, 2011) (“Mere violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act does not confer Article III standing, moreover, where no injury in fact is
properly pled. Otherwise, federal courts will be inundated by web surfers’ endless complaints.” ).
89

First Amended Complaint, Robins v Spokeo, Inc., No CV10-05306 7–8.

90

Spokeo Order (cited in note 88).
Robins v Spokeo, Inc., 742 F3d 409, 412 (9th Cir 2014), vacated and remanded, 136 S Ct
1540 (2016).
91

92
First American remained good law in the Ninth Circuit because of the dismissal of certiorari
two years earlier. Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s en banc rules, see Ninth Circuit Advisory Committee Note to Rules 35-1 to 35-3 (3), nothing automatically vacates or suspends an opinion that
is up for review by the Supreme Court.
93
94

Robins, 742 F3d at 412.
Id at 413.

95

Id at 413–14.

96

Id (quoting Lujan at 578).
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Once again, however, the Supreme Court was not satisﬁed. Justice
Alito wrote an opinion for the Court reversing the Ninth Circuit and
ordering a remand. It was joined by ﬁve other Justices, one of whom—
Justice Thomas—also wrote a separate opinion to which we will return. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented. (The new lineup
shed little light on what had gone wrong in First American; and it is also
possible that the case was reoriented when Justice Scalia died a few
months after argument and (presumably) the drafting assignment.)97
The fundamental tension between Proposition A and Proposition
B was evident in the Court’s opinion in Spokeo. From Proposition B
cases, the Court repeated that “Congress cannot erase Article III’s
standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a
plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing,”98 and that “[i]n no
event may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima.”99 And it denied
that “a plaintiff automatically satisﬁes the injury-in-fact requirement
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”100
But in a nod to the Proposition A cases, the Court also acknowledged that “both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles. . . . because Congress is well positioned to identify
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements,”101
that “Congress may ‘elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law,’”102
and that “‘Congress has the power to deﬁne injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before.’”103

97
Cf. Richard M. Re, Explaining SCOTUS Repeaters, 69 Vand L Rev En Banc 297, 317
(2016) (suggesting this).
98
99

Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1547–48 (quoting Raines, 521 US at 820 n 3).
Id at 1548 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 100 (1979)).

100
101
102

Id at 1549.
Id.
Id (quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578).

103

Id (quoting Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment)). See also Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”: Federal
and State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1831, 1899 (2016) (“Two
competing common heritages can now be drawn upon, one counseling hospitality and the
other committed to limiting both judicial and congressional authority to provide remedies in
courts.”).
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To attempt to ease that tension, the Court’s opinion made a narrow doctrinal innovation, though in the service of a broader, implicit
theme of narrowing Proposition A. The narrow doctrinal innovation
was to focus on asking whether the statutory injury was “concrete.”
The word “concrete” had appeared in the Court’s standing cases
before. For instance, Lujan had described an “injury in fact” as being
“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”104 But the word had not before been given any independent
deﬁnition or meaning in the Court’s standing doctrine.
Prior to Spokeo, in the context of statutory rights, the requirement
that the injury be “concrete” might have seemed to be effectively the
same as the requirement of particularization. This had been Judge
O’Scannlain’s reasoning in the Ninth Circuit opinion below. He
concluded that an injury is “concrete” so long as it is (1) an invasion of
a legal right created by Congress, (2) personal, and (3) individualized.105
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Spokeo disagreed, concluding that
“[c]oncreteness . . . is quite different from particularization.”106 The
Court also concluded that not all legal injuries, and not all injuries to
deﬁned statutory rights, were concrete.107 A statutory right required
something more.
But as to what more, exactly, was required, the Court was somewhat mysterious. Citing dictionaries, it said that to be concrete an
injury “must actually exist,” and be “‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”108 And
yet the harm could also nonetheless be “intangible” or based only on
the “risk of real harm.”109 The Court did not explain, however, why
some statutory rights are not “real,” especially when some intangible
harms apparently can be. After providing a few sentences of guidance
for how to apply this new requirement to the Fair Credit Reporting

104

Lujan, 504 US 555, 560 (1992) (emphasis added; citations and quotation marks omitted).

105

Robins, 742 F3d at 413–14.
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548.

106

107
Id at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean
that a plaintiff automatically satisﬁes the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants
a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that
right”).
108

Id at 1548 (quoting dictionaries).

109

Id at 1549.
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Act itself, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts for further
consideration.110
As noted above, the broader message of the Court’s opinion
seemed to be a certain measure of skepticism about Proposition A,
and a search for some additional rule for limiting Congress’s ability to
create private rights, the invasion of which supports standing. As I
will discuss in a moment, that skepticism, and the Court’s attempt to
implement it, are understandable, but problematic.
There were two other opinions in Spokeo: Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justice Sotomayor, dissented, while largely following the majority’s
framework. Her dissent emphasized the Court’s Proposition A cases111
but also acknowledged the Proposition B cases.112 She also read the
concreteness requirement more narrowly and thought that Robins’s
complaint had already satisﬁed that requirement.113 Justice Thomas,
meanwhile, wrote a concurring opinion attempting to ground the
Court’s standing doctrine in historical principles differentiating public
rights and private rights.114 I will return to his view in Part IV.
III. The Problems with Spokeo’s Answer
Taken seriously, both the larger and smaller implications of
Spokeo are problematic. They cast doubt on standing in several different cases where standing seemed to be widely presumed. That is
not to say that the majority’s approach is obviously wrong. It may
reﬂect just how difﬁcult it is to ﬁnd a principled way of reconciling the
two long-standing propositions of the Court’s case law.
a. nominal damages
The ﬁrst problem with the Court’s ruling in Spokeo is that it creates a
tension with the basic notion of nominal damages. Nominal damages
are damages in a trivial amount—a nominal sum—that allow a plaintiff
to litigate important legal rights without seeking or litigating damages
issues. As we have seen, nominal damages were available at common
110
The Ninth Circuit called for supplemental brieﬁng and argument, and heard argument
again on December 13, 2016. Docket No 108, Robins v Spokeo, No 11-56843 (9th Cir). As of
now, the case remains outstanding.
111
112

136 S Ct at 1554–55 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).
See, for example, id at 1555 (quoting Lujan).

113

Id at 1555–56 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).

114

Id at 1551–53 (Thomas, J, concurring).
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law for trespass claims, where the plaintiff mostly cared about establishing a property right,115 or in libel cases where the plaintiff cared
most about “brand[ing] the defamatory publication as false.”116 Nominal damages have been called “in many respects an early precursor to
the declaratory judgment proceeding.”117
“[I]t has long been settled that a claimant may waive or forgo claims
for compensatory and punitive damages and pursue nominal damages
alone.”118 In more modern cases, the Court has speciﬁcally afﬁrmed
that nominal damages are available to compensate for the violation of
legal rights. In Carey v Piphus, the Court concluded that “the denial of
procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages
without proof of actual injury.”119 And in a later case the Court even
went on to hold that an award of nominal damages is a sufﬁcient
victory to make a plaintiff eligible for attorneys fees (though they
might not actually be awarded in all cases).120
But it is hard to see how nominal damages are fully consistent with
the logic of Spokeo. The very premise of nominal damages is that one
cannot show any “actual injury” apart from the violation of the legal
right itself.121 Spokeo seems to require something more than just the
violation of a legal right. The Spokeo opinion is ambiguous on this
score, given its reference to concrete but “intangible” injuries,122 but
it is nonetheless at odds with the basic idea of nominal damages,
whose very point is that nothing more concrete need be shown.
b. zivotofsky
Spokeo is also inconsistent with other causes of action that the Court
has taken for granted as constitutional up until now. Consider, for
instance, the statutory cause of action that the Court confronted the
115

Webb v Portland Manufacturing Co., 29 F Cas 506 (CCD Me 1838).

116

Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 372 (1974).
James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualiﬁed Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims
for Nominal Damages, 111 Colum L Rev 1601, 1620 (2011). There are some who argue that
nominal damages should not be available in circumstances where a declaratory judgment
would not be. See generally Utah Animal Rights Coalition v Salt Lake City, 371 F3d 1248,
1262–67 (10th Cir 2004) (McConnell, J, concurring).
117

118

Pfander, 111 Colum L Rev at 1620 (cited in note 117).

119

Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247, 266 (1978).
Farrar v Hobby, 506 US 103, 113 (1992).

120
121

Carey, 435 US at 266.

122

136 S Ct at 1549.
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previous year in Zivotofsky v Kerry.123 Zivotofsky presented a separationof-powers issue that arose under Section 214(d) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. Section 214(d) stated
that “[f]or purposes of the registration of birth, certiﬁcation of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the
city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or
the citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.”124 The
suit was brought in the name of a child, Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, to vindicate his statutory right to a passport that said “Israel.”
The Court ultimately concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, at least as applied to passports, because it infringed on the
executive’s power over foreign affairs.125 But under the logic of
Spokeo, it is not clear whether the Court should have gotten that far.
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit had
been forced to confront the question of Zivotofsky’s standing, and it
had relied expressly on the broad form of Proposition A. It wrote:
The Supreme Court has recognized that “Congress may enact statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though
no injury would exist without the statute.” Or stated differently, “Congress
may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which
can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no
judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute.”126

As for the Proposition B cases, the D.C. Circuit understood them
to be limited to having “qualiﬁed statutory standing in one respect,”
namely, the exclusion of “a generalized interest shared by all citizens
in the proper administration of the law.”127 In other words, the D.C.
Circuit’s theory of standing in Zivotofsky tracked almost exactly the
Ninth Circuit’s theory of standing in Spokeo. If Spokeo is right, then it
seems that Zivotofsky was wrong to reach the merits.
To be sure, the Supreme Court may not have focused on the
standing question in Zivotofsky. By 2015 the parties had stopped
123

135 S Ct 2076 (2015).

124

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub L No 107-228, 116 Stat
1350, 1366 (2002).
125
135 S Ct at 2081, 2096. For evaluation of the merits, see Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as
Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 Harv L Rev 112, 115–32 (2015); Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Zivotofsky and the Separation of Powers, 2015 Supreme Court Review 1 (2015).
126
Zivotofsky ex rel Ari Z v Secretary of State, 444 F3d 614, 617 (DC Cir 2006) (quoting Linda
RS v Richard D, 410 US 614, 617 n 3 (1973) and Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 514 (1975)).
127

Zivotofsky ex rel Ari Z, 444 F3d at 618.
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contesting the issue of standing, though the government had contested it before losing on the issue in the D.C. Circuit. But courts have
an obligation to consider standing questions on their own, and both
an amicus brief 128 and some public commentary129 pointed out the
standing problems in Zivotofsky while it was pending in the Supreme
Court. And the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Spokeo just six
weeks before deciding Zivotofsky.130 Nonetheless, none of the Justices
in Zivotofsky acknowledged the standing problem, even though three
of them joined the majority opinion in both that case and Spokeo.
Perhaps some members of the Court thought that standing in
Zivotofsky was permissible because there was a concrete injury apart
from the statutory right. But it is hard to see what that would be. One
could perhaps imagine that some Section 214(d) claimants would
suffer psychological harm from the treatment of their passports, and
one can read Spokeo to treat psychological harms as sufﬁciently
“concrete.”131 But, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out, at the time of its
standing decision Menachem Zivotofsky was “only three years old”
and any psychological harm seemed “conjectural.”132 What is more,
standing is supposed to exist when the complaint is ﬁled.133 When the
complaint in Zivotofsky was ﬁled, Menachem was eleven months
old.134 It seems implausible that he had any psychological harm from
the contents of his passport at that time.

128
Brief of True Torah Jews as amicus curiae in support of respondent, Zivotofsky v Kerry,
No 13-628 (US Supreme Court, ﬁled Sept 29, 2014).
129
William Baude, The Standing Problem in Zivotofsky, Revisited, Washington Post, Volokh
Conspiracy (Dec 4, 2014), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2014/12/04/the-standing-problem-in-zivotofsky-revisited/; William Baude, The Legal Power
of “Standing,” NY Times (May 14, 2015), at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/opinion
/the-legal-power-of-standing.html. But see Andy Hessick, Zivotofsky and Spokeo, Notice &
Comment: A Blog from the Yale J on Reg (May 18, 2015), at http://www.yalejreg.com/blog
/zivotofsky-and-spokeo-by-andy-hessick.
130
135 S Ct 1892 (2015) (granting certiorari).
131
Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81 Brooklyn L Rev
1555, 1568–69, 1597–98 (2016).
132
Zivotofsky ex rel Ari Z, 444 F3d at 617.
133
See Newman-Green v Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 US 826, 830 (1989) (“The existence of federal
jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is ﬁled.”); Lujan, 504
US at 569 n 4 (plurality); see also Campbell-Ewald v Gomez, 136 S Ct 663, 669 (2016) (Article III
“demand[s] that an actual controversy be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is ﬁled.”) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
134
Complaint, Zivotofsky v Secretary of State, No 03-1921 (DDC, ﬁled Sept 16, 2003)
(noting Menachem Zivotofsky’s birthdate as October 17, 2002).
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Or perhaps one could characterize Zivotofsky’s injury as expressive.
Spokeo gave as examples of permissible “intangible injuries” violations
of free speech and free exercise rights,135 and one could see the right
to put one’s country of origin on one’s passport as an expressive right.
But that seems like a strained interpretation of the passport (and one
that the majority in Zivotofsky indeed rejected).136 Moreover, it simply
raises the question why the abstract rights to engage in free speech
and free exercise are “concrete” but the right to reasonable accuracy
in Spokeo might not be.
One might dismiss the question of standing in Zivotofsky as a moot
point. The Justices did not discuss the standing question, and therefore
the case establishes no precedent on standing.137 But the contrary
treatment of standing in Zivotofsky and Spokeo suggests that there is
something confused about the Court’s intuitions in this area. Moreover, the question of standing in cases like Zivotofsky may well arise
again, even under the very same statute. That is because Section 214(d)
applies not only to passports but to consular reports of birth abroad.
Justice Thomas expressly distinguished the two and argued that Congress has greater power to regulate the latter in light of its naturalization power.138 And the majority expressly reserved the question because it had been waived.139 Hence, if Jersusalem-born U.S. citizens
wish to litigate the issue of consular birth reports, the courts will have
to confront the standing question in light of Spokeo.
c. privacy
Finally, Spokeo has also raised questions about the enforcement of
privacy statutes throughout the lower courts. In these cases, plaintiffs
sue somebody who has illegally disclosed information about them;

135

Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549.
For example, Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2095 (describing “a passport’s place-of-birth section
as an ofﬁcial executive statement”).
136

137
Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v Winn, 563 US 125, 144 (2011) (“When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision
does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.”).
138

135 S Ct at 2109–11 ( Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

139

Id at 2083 (“The arguments in Zivotofsky’s brief center on his passport claim, as opposed to the consular report of birth abroad. . . . He has . . . waived the issue here by failing to
differentiate between the two documents. As a result, the Court addresses Zivotofsky’s
passport arguments and need not engage in a separate analysis of the validity of § 214(d) as
applied to consular reports of birth abroad.”).
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they are then confronted with the question of whether illegal disclosure of information, without more, is a concrete injury under
Spokeo. Remarkably, most courts have said “no.” Taken seriously, this
would imply constitutional limits on federal enforcement of privacy
rights. This further demonstrates the implausibility of Spokeo.
For instance, last summer the D.C. Circuit confronted a lawsuit by
two D.C. shoppers who complained that local clothing stores had
demanded their zip codes in violation of local law. Without disputing
that the information was illegally demanded, D.C. Circuit dismissed
the case for lack of standing.140 The forced disclosure of one’s zip
code, it held, was not a concrete injury after Spokeo. In Spokeo the
Court had offered a coincidentally similar example, writing: “not all
inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm. An
example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is
difﬁcult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code,
without more, could work any concrete harm.”141
The D.C. Circuit found the dictum apt, writing, “If, as the Supreme Court advised, disclosure of an incorrect zip code is not a
concrete Article III injury, then even less so is [the plaintiffs’] naked
assertion that a zip code was requested and recorded without any
concrete consequence. [The plaintiffs] do not allege, for example, any
invasion of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity theft, or pecuniary or emotional injury.”142
This is probably the correct conclusion to draw from Spokeo’s
somewhat gratuitous discussion of zip codes, but at a more fundamental level it again suggests that something is wrong with Spokeo.
Why must the plaintiffs show something like a risk of identity theft or
emotional injury to demonstrate a concrete injury? Why can’t an
illegal disclosure itself be a concrete injury? As to a zip code, this may
seem strange. But imagine that the illegal disclosure was something
else—an unﬂattering photograph or email, perhaps. Surely this
ought to be actionable without showing a subsequent consequence,
like the loss of one’s job or social standing. Or, more modestly,
imagine somebody who is embarrassed by their middle name and
does not wish to see it disclosed. If that person has a legal right against
disclosure, why should they need anything more?
140

Hancock v Urban Outﬁtters, 830 F3d 511 (DC Cir 2016) (Millett, J).

141

Spokeo, 135 S Ct at 1550.

142

Hancock, 830 F3d at 514.
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There are two possible ways to resolve the scope of privacy laws in
light of the courts’ position on zip codes. One possibility, the more
aggressive one, is to conclude that illegal disclosure of facts about
oneself is never itself a concrete injury. To sue over the disclosure of
one’s address, photos, name, or anything else, one would have to
demonstrate some sort of downstream consequences from these
disclosures. In other words, privacy itself would not be a protectable
interest under Article III. This position has a certain logical purity,
but one hopes that it is too implausible even for today’s courts to
adopt. It would mean that even injuries recognized under longstanding common law principles would not be enough to satisfy the
“injury in fact” requirement.143
The alternative possibility, a more modest one, is that some illegal
disclosures are injurious in themselves, and others are not. For instance, perhaps the disclosure of photographs is different in kind from
the disclosure of zip codes, even if both are protected by legal right.
(The D.C. Circuit’s attempt to distinguish “invasion of privacy” as an
actionable “concrete consequence” might point to this possibility.)144
There is some common sense intuition behind this approach, but it is
not entirely principled. If the legislature has made the judgment to
protect both kinds of information, it is not at all clear why judges may
decide that one is “concrete,” that is, “real,” and the other is not.145
This saves some of privacy law from Spokeo only by creating a constitutional common law of privacy interests.
Other post-Spokeo decisions in the lower courts reveal more ambiguity and troubling possibilities. For instance, in Braitberg v Charter
Communications, the Eighth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit brought by a
former customer complaining that his cable company had illegally
retained some of his personal information in violation of federal law.146

143
See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193,
206–13 (1890) (suggesting that under “the existing law” the “invasion of privacy” is “a legal
injuria”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) (collecting cases).
144
Hancock, 830 F3d at 514 (“Hancock and White do not allege, for example, any invasion
of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity theft, or pecuniary or emotional injury.”).
145
See Leading Case, Spokeo, Inc. v Robins, 130 Harv L Rev 437, 444–45 (2016) (“For example, even incorrect zip codes assuredly cause harm of some degree, since insurance and marketing companies often segment by zip code, and individuals are prone to make generalizations
about race, religion, or ethnicity based on where somebody lives. The pertinent question is not
exactly how much harm is caused, but why is it not harm enough?”).
146

836 F3d 925 (8th Cir 2016).
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The court concluded that illegally retaining personal information was
not itself a harm for which Congress could authorize suit, suggesting
once again that Article III might impose limits on federal privacy law.
Like the D.C. Circuit, the Eighth Circuit tried to salvage some
privacy law, by noting that in this case the defendant had not “disclosed the information to a third party” nor “used the information
in any way during the disputed period.”147 This was relevant, said the
court, because at common law, “the retention of information lawfully
obtained, without further disclosure, traditionally has not provided
the basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”148 This is somewhat
reassuring for privacy law, but not entirely. In rejecting Congress’s
attempts to modestly expand the scope of personal informational
rights in the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Eighth Circuit
cast doubt on whether Congress can expand privacy rights beyond
their common law scope at all. It is unclear why, in this area, Congress
should not be allowed to protect interests beyond those protected by
the common law, as it has been allowed in other cases.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has taken the opposite lesson
from Spokeo. In In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation,149 the
court concluded that statutory privacy claims automatically supply
standing. Dealing with a class of consumers who alleged that Viacom
had illegally disclosed children’s web-browsing data to Google, the
court wrote that while their harms were “perhaps ‘intangible,’” they
nonetheless presented “a clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information.”150 While the D.C. Circuit
in Hancock thought the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information was not an injury without more—without some consequences ﬂowing from that unlawful disclosure—the Third Circuit
thought that the disclosure was itself the harm.
d. substantive due process all over again?
The purpose of reciting these problematic implications of Spokeo
is not to show that Article III limits on statutory standing are obvi-

147
148
149

Id at 930.
Id.
827 F3d 262 (2016).

150

Id at 274. See also In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F3d
625 (3d Cir 2017) (reafﬁrming this holding).
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ously wrong. While there may once have been widespread academic
skepticism of restrictions on Congress’s plenary power to confer
standing through statutory rights,151 that power has been limited in
several cases that seem well entrenched. But even accepting those
limits, the conﬂict between the Court’s two lines of standing doctrine
raises tricky problems, and Spokeo does not do much to solve them.
Indeed, the Court’s so far unsuccessful quest to deﬁne the limits of
statutory standing is reminiscent of the path of another doctrine—
that of substantive due process. This analogy has been made before
by some critics of Proposition B’s limits on statutory standing152
who have said that it “uses highly contestable ideas about political
theory to invalidate congressional enactments, even though the relevant constitutional text and history do not call for invalidation at
all”153—an analogy intended as “particular anathema to those members of the Court most anxious to tell us that there are Article III
limitations on statutory grants of standing.”154 The analogy between
standing limitations and substantive due process is an apt one, but in a
more nuanced and sympathetic way than those critics may intend.
The vagueness of Proposition B, illustrated by Spokeo, invites courts
either to fashion constitutional limits out of nothing, or to say that
only interests protected by the common law satisfy Article III
requirements—both paths that have proven unworkable in the substantive due process context.
In a nutshell, one story of substantive due process’s early rise is this:
The Due Process Clause forbids deprivations of “life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”155 This was paradigmatically
understood as a rule regulating the executive and judicial branches,
requiring them to obey the positive law when their actions might
injure a private person.156 It might have been satisfying to conclude

151
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev
1669, 1734–42 (1975); David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Supreme Court
Review 41, 42–43, 47; Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 253–54 (cited in note 7); Sunstein, 91 Mich L
Rev at 191–92, 236 (cited in note 8).
152
Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 233 (cited in note 7); Sunstein, 91 Mich L Rev at 205–06, 234–
35 (cited in note 8).
153
154
155

Sunstein, 91 Mich L Rev at 167 (cited in note 8).
Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 233 (cited in note 7).
US Const, Art V. See also id Art XIV.

156

John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 Va L Rev 493, 504–
05 (1997).
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that the clause does not apply to the legislature at all—and seemingly
consistent with due process’s forebearer, the requirement that the
government conform to “the law of the land.”157 But the clause could
not easily ignore the legislature, for what if the legislature passed a
statute saying that the executive branch could do whatever it wished
and dispense with the courts? Or what if the legislature itself directly
effected the deprivation? In order to prevent what seem like obvious
evasions of the clause, it was logical to characterize those legislative
actions, too, as deprivations of due process.158
Perhaps one could still hold the line by insisting that the requirement as applied to the legislature be strictly procedural: The
legislature could create whatever substantive rules or liabilities it
wished so long as they were adjudicated by a court and through “due”
procedures. But regulations of substance can circumvent the requirements of process. What if, for example, the legislature passes a
statute making it a crime to be on an ofﬁcially maintained list of
enemy combatants? One can have all of the process one likes, limited
to the single element of the offense: whether one is on the list. The
hypothetical is troubling because its substance makes procedure irrelevant.
And while courts did not confront exactly that hypothetical, they
confronted other substantive regulations that seemed similar to them,
such as a law providing for the one-time election of county clerks,159 or
a law prohibiting the sale of liquor,160 and found them to violate due
process principles.161 These substantive rules came so close to evading
the constitutionally required process that it seemed natural to invalidate them too. Thus due process expanded to include certain substantive constraints that supplement procedural due process, such as
157
Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L J 408,
428–35 (2010).
158
Harrison, 83 Va L Rev at 506–20 (cited in note 156) (describing, though not endorsing,
this move); Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L J 1672, 1713–17 (2012) (describing Alexander Hamilton’s view); id at 1724
(“Most American courts and jurists in the early Republic agreed, at a minimum, that legislative enactments that authorized other branches to deprive persons of life, liberty, or
property without traditional procedural protections or their equivalent violated due process.”).
159
Hoke v Henderson, 15 NC (4 Dev) 1 (1833).
160

Wynehamer v People, 13 NY 378 (1856).

161

See Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1751–54, 1768–70 (cited in note 158) and
Williams, 120 Yale L J at 461, 465, 468–70 (cited in note 157) for discussion.

This content downloaded from 128.135.012.127 on June 24, 2017 15:16:24 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

226

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2016

the requirements that legislation authorizing deprivations be “general”
or “prospective.”162
But once one has started invalidating substantive regulations, it
is easy to see how one slips into even more “substantive” applications
of due process—whether a right to freedom of contract or a right
to intimate decision making or what have you. Having abandoned
the most formally stark principles, like the rule that due process does
not apply to the legislature, or applies only to process and never to
substance, the doctrinal category has tended to drift out into more
open territory. And in this open sea, courts looking for landmarks
instead drift to things like common-law tradition or their own ethical
intuitions.
This is not to say that this evolution from formally procedural to
broadly substantive due process is inevitable—on the contrary! Many
jurists and scholars have put forward plausible theories about how
and where the stopping line should have been drawn. But it is to say
that it is easier than one might think to slip from formal procedural
rules to quite substantive judge-made ones. And it is hard to draw a
coherent, stable line in such an area by proceeding only in intuitive,
case-by-case fashion.
Congressionally created standing has much the same character. It
might have been satisfying to conclude that standing limitations do
not apply to the legislature at all—but that would suggest that Congress could even go so far as to authorize federal courts to issue advisory opinions, whose illegality is supposedly one of the paradigm
rules of Article III. It seemed natural enough, perhaps even necessary,
to describe the legal right to an advisory opinion as violating the requirement of a “judicial” “case” or “controversy.” This gives us Muskrat, the ﬁrst of the standing cases supporting today’s Proposition B.163
Even once standing doctrine has extended to limit legislatively
created rights, one might attempt to limit that doctrine to a ban on
advisory opinions. But courts saw in some procedural legal rights the
162
Chapman and McConnell, 121 Yale L J at 1717, 1738 (cited in note 158); Williams, 120
Yale L J at 423–25 (cited in note 157).
163
219 US 346 (1911) (discussed at notes 56–60). See also Richard M. Re, Relative Standing,
102 Georgetown L J 1191, 1232 (2014) (“[T]he Court has . . . insisted that there are limits on
Congress’s power to confer standing, and it is easy to see why. Unfettered authority to confer
standing would empower the political branches to compel adjudication of controversies that
are, as presented, poorly suited to judicial resolution. And courts have said for decades, even
centuries, that effective judicial resolution of disputes is facilitated through adjudication focused by concrete adversity.” (citing Muskrat)).
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same things that had concerned them about advisory opinions—the
possibility of courts being asked to adjudicate only “[t]he public’s
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.”164
And once courts have started invalidating such statutory rights, it is
easy to see how they might keep going. The rule that all federal legal
rights can be vindicated in federal court has been replaced with a
judicial limitation on which legal rights are sufﬁciently real to be
judicially enforced. Such judicial limitation is not inherently ﬂawed,
but the Court has not fully understood the problem it is trying to
solve, and so it has not deployed a solution that is likely to solve it.
The concept of “concreteness” does not do much to resolve these
problems. Nor does it help to rephrase that term, as Spokeo does, into
a judicial inquiry into which injuries, including “intangible” ones, are
nonetheless “real.”165 What makes some rights “real” enough to
justify nominal damages, and others insufﬁciently real to justify the
statutory damages available under the Fair Credit Reporting Act?
What makes the word “Israel” on Menachem Zivotofsky’s passport
more concrete than the word “married” on Robins’s Spokeo proﬁle?
What makes the zip code disclosed in Hancock less concrete than the
internet cookie disclosed in Nickelodeon?
The way to make the concept of “intangible” yet “real” injury coherent is to say that only injuries recognized in some form by the
common law will sufﬁce. But this is a position that the Court has
(rightly) rejected, and it is one that is not really reconciled to a postLochner world. The inquiry in Spokeo looks, at best, like an effort to
identify the subset of statutory rights that vaguely resemble the common law. That inquiry is both indeﬁnite, but more importantly, misguided. So while the doctrinal problem faced in Spokeo is a genuinely
tricky one, the Court’s attempted answer should be classiﬁed as a
misstep.
IV. Justice Thomas’s Alternative
One Justice on the Spokeo Court seemed to see the problem.
Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion in full, wrote a
164
Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in
part).
165
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548–49. See also Re, 102 Georgetown L J at 1203 (cited in note 163)
(arguing that because of the failure of the concept of adequate factual injury, “the Court has
adopted a ‘standard’ for factual injury deﬁned only by a list of synonymous adjectives”).
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concurring opinion that put forward a proposed rule that is both
theoretically and historically consistent and that may provide a way to
reconcile the tension between Proposition A and Proposition B.
Justice Thomas’s opinion built off of insightful articles by Andrew
Hessick166 and by Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson.167 While
Justice Thomas’s argument may need to be articulated more fully in
the future, here are the essential parts:
The fundamental inquiry that standing derives from is who is a
“proper party” to a given lawsuit. Having the so-called proper party is
an independent requirement for judicial cognizance of a case.168 Most
importantly, the “proper party” for bringing a lawsuit depends very
much on whether the suit is one to vindicate public rights or private
rights. Public rights are owed “to the whole community, considered
as a community, in its social aggregate capacity,”169 such as “free navigation of waterways, passage on public highways, and general compliance with regulatory law.”170 Public rights can most paradigmatically be vindicated by the government itself.171 But they can also be
vindicated by private people if those people suffered “special damage”
that distinguishes them from other members of the public.172
By contrast, private rights are those “belonging to individuals,
considered as individuals,”173 such as “rights of personal security (including security of reputation), property rights, and contract rights.”174
They can be vindicated by the holders of those private rights regardless of what kind of damage they had suffered. These include the

166

Hessick, 93 Cornell L Rev at 275 (cited in note 12).

167

Woolhandler and Nelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 689 (cited in note 8).

168

Id at 695 (“The concept of proper parties is central to standing doctrine, and it may also
infuse notions of a ‘Case’”). The relationship of proper parties to Article III may also explain
the constitutionalization of sovereign immunity. See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a
Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv L Rev 1559, 1568–75 (2002). See also William
Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 Va L Rev 1 (2017).
169
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas, J, concurring) (quoting 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries at ∗5).
170
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas, J, concurring) (quoting Woolhander and Nelson,
102 Mich L Rev at 693 (cited in note 8)).
171

Hessick, 93 Cornell L Rev at 278–279 (cited in note 12).

172

Woolhandler and Nelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 701 (cited in note 8).
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas, J, concurring) (quoting 3 William Blackstone,
Commentaries at ∗2).
173

174
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citing 1 Blackstone at ∗130–∗39
and Woolhander and Nelson, 102 Mich L Rev at 693 (cited in note 8)).
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instances of nominal damages and trespass without injury discussed
earlier.175
Put together, these two principles led Justice Thomas to the
conclusion that Proposition A controlled in private rights cases, while
Proposition B controlled in public rights cases:
Congress can create new private rights and authorize private plaintiffs to
sue based simply on the violation of those private rights. A plaintiff seeking
to vindicate a statutorily created private right need not allege actual harm
beyond the invasion of that private right. A plaintiff seeking to vindicate a
public right embodied in a federal statute, however, must demonstrate that
the violation of that public right has caused him a concrete, individual harm
distinct from the general population. Thus, Congress cannot authorize
private plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names, absent some
showing that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm particular to him.176

This position has several virtues. It is consistent with the historical
antecedents of standing doctrine, and also basically consistent with
the Court’s invocations of Propositions A and B. Under this theory,
the Proposition A cases are generally correct because Congress had in
those cases created a private right, which can be enforced by the
holder of that right without anything more.177 Meanwhile, Lujan and
Summers and Muskrat and Raines—the Proposition B cases—are
correct because they all involve the enforcement of a public right,
namely, that of “general compliance with regulatory law.”178
I am not certain that this position is sound, but it is plausible and
generally consistent with history and doctrine, and it provides an
actual attempt at a way forward. The historical categories of public
and private rights, though not of crystalline purity, seem more
workable and more apt than the Court’s struggle to deﬁne some
injuries as “real” and “concrete.” By focusing the inquiry on the
distinction between public and private rights, Justice Thomas helps
us see that the question is not about whether the injury matches some
platonic class of real injuries, but rather about whether Congress has

175
176

See notes 12–15.
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1553 (Thomas, J, concurring) (citations omitted).

177
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in FEC v Akins, 524 US 11, 30 (1998),
which argued that the cause of action in that case should be narrowly construed to avoid
rendering it unconstitutional. It is possible, but not certain, that the cause of action at issue in
Akins could be seen as conferring a private right to information, rather than a public right.
178
Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas, J, concurring) (quoting Woolhander & Nelson, 102
Mich L Rev at 693 (cited in note 8)).
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given the right a particular form—a form that matches the judicial
function in resolving it.
To be sure, Justice Thomas’s position, and the scholarship on
which he relied, does not fully resolve an important and hard question: Under what circumstances can Congress privatize a previously
public right? When and how can Congress convert a legal duty that
might traditionally have seemed public into a private one?179 Answering this question will be important to know whether a new
statutory right should be classed with the cases under Proposition A
or Proposition B.
It seems to me that Justice Thomas’s approach could yield at least
two plausible answers to this question, one more restrictive of
Congress’s power and one more generous. Under the more restrictive approach, one might say that private rights must take a particular
form. For instance, at one point Justice Thomas deployed a quotation
from Tennessee Electric Power v TVA,180 implying that a private right
must have one of four speciﬁc forms.181 It must be “‘a legal right,—
one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against
tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.’”182
These categories exclude the Proposition B cases. None of them
were rights of property or contract. The “procedural right” at issue in
Lujan and Summers was not a “privilege,” at least if that term is used
in the Hohfeldian sense of being “the opposite of a duty, and the
correlative of a ‘no-right.’”183 It did not give its holders the privilege
to do anything, other than sue to enforce the duty it imposed on
the government.184 Nor was it “protected from tortious invasion,”185

179
Cf. William Baude and James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
129 Harv L Rev 1821, 1880 (2016) (noting that “one of the great debates among legal
theorists is over how to determine whether and upon whom a legal duty confers a legal right”
and that it is “not yet resolved”).
180

306 US 118 (1939).

181

Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1553 (Thomas, J, concurring).
Id (quoting Tennessee Electric, 306 US at 137–38).

182

183
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16, 32 (1913).
184
This made it a “right in the strictest sense.” Id at 30. See also id at 32 (“In other words, if
X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent)
is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place”).
185

306 US at 138.
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because the government’s violation of the right was not treated as a
tort or subject to damages. The same seems even more clearly true of
Raines and Muskrat.
Under this restrictive approach, however, rights like those at issue
in Spokeo may well be validly created private rights, because they do
seem to be “protected against tortious invasion.”186 Hence, Justice
Thomas concluded that if the Fair Credit Reporting Act created “a
private duty owed personally to Robins to protect his information,”
that was enough for standing, but not if it “vests any and all
consumers with the power to police the ‘reasonable procedures’ of
Spokeo, without more.”187
There is also a more permissive version of Justice Thomas’s approach, one that would not wed itself to particular Hohfeldian categories or the language of Tennessee Electric. Under this version, any
legal duty may be said to create a private right so long as it is adequately personalized—owed to a speciﬁc person or group of persons
rather than to the public at large.
There are parts of Justice Thomas’s opinion that point to this
more permissive formulation188 and it would have the advantage of
simplicity. It would not get bogged down in categories like “privilege” or “tortious invasion.”189 Indeed, this more permissive approach
would look a great deal like what Judge O’Scannlain had written
for the Ninth Circuit earlier in the Spokeo litigation: that a statutory
right is an enforceable private right if it is “individualized rather than
collective,” and if the person suing is “among the injured.”190 In other
words, Justice Thomas’s concurrence not only suggests that the majority opinion in Spokeo was a misstep, but also suggests that a more
principled and workable approach may have been lying in front of
the Court all along.

186

Id.

187

Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1554 (there was some statutory ambiguity on that point).
Id (Thomas, J, concurring) (emphasizing the question of whether there was “a private
duty owed personally to Robins”).
188

189

Id (quoting Tennesse Electric, 306 US at 137–38).

190

Robins v Spokeo, Inc., 742 F3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir 2014).
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